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What Can Medicine
Teach the Social Sciences?
*

by LEE MCINTYRE

Editor’s Note: In a field as slow to change as the law, it is often
helpful to inject fresh perspectives from other disciplines. As
different as legal analysis might be from that found in the
medical and social sciences, they are all ultimately concerned
with the pursuit of objectivity. Furthermore, in each of these
fields, the pursuit of academic and practical goals are
permeated and influenced by the values of those that seek to
achieve them. Indeed, both the law and the social sciences in
particular are fundamentally concerned with finding ways of
distilling logic and order from the complexities of human
behavior. Thus, there is much to be learned from how medicine
and the social sciences reconcile these often competing goals, a
comparison artfully explored by Lee McIntyre in the following
editorial.

In the debate over whether social science can someday hope to
achieve the same degree of scientific rigor that has been met in
natural science—usually taken to consist of physics, chemistry, and
biology—it is often argued that there are insuperable limits to what
1
can be attained in the study of human behavior. In the natural
sciences, many contend, we are dealing with a subject matter about
which we can pursue inquiry dispassionately, with little concern for
how the knowledge will be used once it is gathered and few worries
that our objectivity may be clouded by the close relationship that we
bear to the subject of inquiry. Not so, it is argued, in the study of
human behavior. In social science we have a vested interest not only

* Lee McIntyre is a Research Fellow at the Center for Philosophy and History of Science
at Boston University and an Instructor in Ethics at Harvard Extension School. He holds a
B.A. from Wesleyan University and a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of
Michigan (Ann Arbor).
1. For a discussion of such alleged limits, see Lee McIntyre, LAWS AND
EXPLANATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: DEFENDING A SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1996).
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in the truth or falsity of competing theories about what causes
behavior, but also in how these theories may be used to shape the
social environment. Even if a science of human behavior were in
principle possible, some hold, it could not be realized due to the
inevitable biases that we bring to the study of a subject matter about
which we care so deeply.
Of course, the last forty years of the philosophy of science has
done much to disabuse us of the notion that objectivity is so easily
purchased even in natural scientific inquiry; indeed, the history of
some of the greatest scientific debates over the last 500 years—from
Copernican astronomy to Darwinian evolution—has demonstrated
just how closely the concerns of natural science may tread upon the
egocentric assumptions that are inevitably present in any scientific
endeavor. But, notwithstanding the question of whether objectivity
in any science is perfectly achievable, can’t the case be made that
natural science has done pretty well for itself? Despite the challenges
of normativity and subjectivity, natural science has thrived. Can one
reasonably hope that in the fullness of time the same might be true of
the social sciences?
In considering this question it is fruitful to remember not merely
that physics, chemistry, and biology are not value free, but also that
these three sciences do not exhaust the realm of successful scientific
advancement over the last few centuries. Indeed, despite the fact that
most philosophy of science focuses almost exclusively on a narrow set
of issues that arise out of physics and biology, we see in medicine an
example of a comparatively recent scientific revolution that occurred
despite enormous closeness to the human issues at stake, and that
bears a close resemblance to the current situation in the social
sciences.
Medicine, like social science, doesn’t fit well with the
“dispassionate” ideal that is allegedly met by good scientific practice.
Values permeate the science of medicine. A physician wants his or
her patients to remain healthy. Disease and death are regarded as the
enemy. Knowledge is gathered in the hope that it may be used to
cure the sick and to prolong the life and well-being of all patients.
Nonetheless, modern medicine is firmly based on a footing of science.
Today’s medical practices are founded on double-blind clinical trials
and exacting statistical work done by medical researchers. Despite
the over-arching desire to gather knowledge that may be used to cure
disease and to alleviate suffering—which are normative values—
medicine is well served by the conviction not to let its practical goals
cloud the vision of what can actually be learned from experience.
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Why? Because it is no benefit to the patient for a physician or
researcher to pretend to see what is not really there.
In its mission to gather knowledge despite the entanglements of
normativity and subjectivity, social science faces a challenge not
unlike that of medicine.
In macroeconomics, for instance,
practitioners are concerned with the “health” of the economy and
have a value-laden orientation toward the subject matter. Except in
the most unusual circumstances, economists want unemployment to
be low and productivity to be high. Inflation, in most cases, is bad. A
growing stable economy is viewed as the goal of virtually all
macroeconomic analysis.
Values thus permeate inquiry in
macroeconomics in that economists gather data and try to learn from
it primarily in order to achieve a desired outcome.
But why, then, is the scientific status of medicine taken to be so
different from that of social science? Why do so many people accept
the idea that medicine is a science but that economics could not be?
It couldn’t be solely due to such problems as normativity and
subjectivity, for surely these are challenges that are shared by both
fields. Indeed, the very success of medicine despite the values that
permeate it belies the argument that it is impossible to achieve
scientific success in the face of a subject matter that is of direct human
concern. Does this provide reason for thinking that—once it
embraces the proper methodology—social science too may become
more scientific?
The Youngest Science

Medicine was not always scientific. Although it is easy to forget
in an age of routine inoculations and miraculous transplants, the
successes of medicine were hard won against the ignorance of basic
human pathogenesis that existed as recently as a century ago. During
the Enlightenment, there was great hope that medicine would finally
be able to lift itself out of the long dark period of superstition and
ignorance that had characterized its early history. With the shining
example of the Scientific Revolution in physics laid before it, efforts
were made to throw off the Scholastic tradition of settling scientific
matters by argument rather than by experiment, in the hope of basing
medical knowledge on a firm foundation of science. These hopes
were largely frustrated, however, until well into the 19th century,
when the work of Pasteur and Koch led to the new field of
bacteriology. With the gradual acceptance of the germ theory of
disease and the rise of several public health measures based on
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empirical methods, it was only after 1860 that medicine truly began to
2
undergo its own scientific revolution.
It is well to remember, however, that for all of the talk about the
beginnings of a science of medicine in the mid-19th century, it was
only in the mid-20th century that clinical practice was able to catch up
and fulfill the therapeutic promise of this new science. Even in the
early decades of the 20th century, a doctor’s role was largely confined
to explaining the course of a disease to the afflicted patient, not
intervening in its path. Even basic physical examination was not
universally practiced, as many physicians instead preferred to take
lengthy histories and offer voluminous prescriptions that were little
more than placebos. In the words of Lewis Thomas, in his memoir of
medical practice in the 1930s,
Explanation was the real business of medicine. What the ill
patient and his family wanted most was to know the name of
the illness, and then, if possible, what had caused it, and finally,
most important of all, how it was likely to turn out. . . . For most
of the infectious diseases on the wards of the Boston City
Hospital in 1937, there was nothing to be done beyond bed rest
3
and good nursing care.

Another writer paints a similarly grim portrait of medical
practice during this era:
Twentieth-century medicine was struggling for the scientific
footing that physics began to achieve in the seventeenth
century. Its practitioners wielded the authority granted to
healers throughout human history; they spoke a specialized
language and wore the mantle of professional schools and
societies; but their knowledge was a pastiche of folk wisdom
and quasi-scientific fads. Few medical researchers understood
the rudiments of controlled statistical experimentation.
Authorities argued for or against particular therapies roughly
2. It is of course controversial to claim that a scientific revolution starts at any
particular time, and in medicine it is no different. Some scholars would date the beginning
of the scientific era in medicine as early as 1628, when William Harvey discovered the
circulation of blood. Others would mark it at various advances that took place in the 18th
century. But, as Roy Porter points out in his book The Greatest Benefit to Mankind, it was
only after the founding of bacteriology in the mid-19th century that the clinical promise of
medicine was based firmly on a foundation of experimental discovery and scientific rigor
that “led directly and rapidly to genuinely effective preventive measures and remedies,
savings lives on a dramatic scale.” Roy Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind 428
(1999). Surely this constitutes a revolution.
3. Lewis Thomas, THE YOUNGEST SCIENCE: NOTES OF A MEDICINE-WATCHER 28,
35 (1983).
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the way theologians argued for or against their theories, by
employing a combination of personal experience, abstract
4
reason, and aesthetic judgment.

All of this changed with the discovery of penicillin in 1940. In
the pharmacological revolution that followed—which brought sulfa
drugs and antibiotics into routine use—medicine at last began to
enjoy in clinical success the fruit of the scientific revolution that had
started 80 years earlier. With the success of the new drugs, the old
ways of practicing medicine began to wane, with the home remedies
and palliatives of bedside consultation soon replaced by drugs that
had resulted from laboratory research and large scale clinical trials.
Medicine, at last, had become a science.
Prescription for the Social Sciences

To the student of history, what is most impressive about the story
of medical science is not just its success but its recency. To the
methodologist what also jumps out is the challenge, “if medicine can
do it, why can’t social science?” Indeed, note just how accurately the
quoted descriptions of medicine in the 1930s might, with just a few
changes in wording, be used to characterize the impoverished state of
social scientific knowledge and its effect on public policy at the dawn
of the 21st century.
Of course, some would argue that the comparison is false; that
the problem of subjectivity is much worse in the social sciences than it
is in any other field of inquiry in that we face a unique challenge by
being both the investigator and the object of inquiry. Given this,
some hold, we cannot help but to proceed in a way that is less than
scientific.
The problem with this view is not that subjectivity is not a real
problem in social science. The problem is that subjectivity is often
used as an excuse for conducting bad social science. Yes, it is hard to
be objective in the study of our own behavior. Yet, if the critics are
right, and we cannot hope to achieve perfect objectivity in any
scientific study, then one might rightfully ask why the social sciences
cannot hope to do at least as well as the natural sciences in this
regard? After all, it is these same flawed, self-interested human
beings that conduct natural science who do social science as well.
Success in contending with subjectivity could not in social science, any
more so than in natural science, depend on perfect individuals who
4. James Gleick, Genius: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF RICHARD FEYNMAN 132
(1992).
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are beyond the ken of subjectivity. As we see throughout the history
of natural science, the investigation of nature too has individuals who
prefer their own theories and are inclined to ignore evidence that
does not fit them. But, when properly conducted, science as a whole
is more objective than its practitioners, for science progresses by
discovering the mistakes of others. Indeed, it is the appeal to
evidential standards that keeps science as objective as it is. Thus,
wishful thinking in science is rooted out not because of unique
intellectual honesty amongst scientists, but because of the fear of
public embarrassment against objective standards.
Yet here we face what may well be a real difference between the
practice of natural and social science. For in natural science, even if
one realizes that it cannot be achieved perfectly in practice, there is
healthy respect for objectivity as an ideal and a conviction that the
only means of resolving a scientific dispute is to appeal to the
evidence. In natural science, the extent to which we bring ideological
factors to bear on our inquiry is to be repudiated. Yet, in the social
sciences, the importation of our political and social interests too often
seems to be accepted as part and parcel of the way that research is
conducted.
This is not to say that in social science the evidence is ignored
completely, or that social scientific theories are made up out of whole
cloth. It is rather to say that in much of social science, unlike natural
science, the practitioners are not nearly so embarrassed about mixing
up their ideological assumptions with positive inquiry. Much of what
passes for social research these days consists of those who already
know what policy they would like to support gathering evidence in its
favor. Consequently, a good deal of social science is so ideological in
its orientation that the very idea of fashioning social science as the
empirical study of human behavior has, to many practitioners,
become something of a disciplinary joke. As one social scientist has
put it:
[M]ost of the most influential work in the social sciences is
ideological, and most of our criticisms of each other are
ideologically grounded.
Non social scientists generally
recognize the fact that the social sciences are mostly ideological,
and that they have produced in this century a very small
amount of scientific knowledge compared to the great bulk of
their publications. Our claim to being scientific is one of the
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main intellectual scandals of the academic world, though most
5
of us live comfortably with our shame.

Unfortunately, within such a politically charged research
environment, even where careful empirical work has been done, it is
almost routinely ignored or dismissed by policy makers.
A recent example, drawn from the field of criminal justice, will
suffice to make the point. One of the most overlooked ills of the
American judicial system is the problem of wrongful convictions. In
light of the growth of mandatory sentencing guidelines and a
diminishing national reluctance to employ capital punishment,
however, the charge to be certain that those convicted are actually
guilty of the crime is of paramount importance. As a recent survey of
the problem has pointed out, “[e]ach year, in the United States, more
than seventy-five thousand people become criminal suspects based on
eyewitness identification, with lineups used as a standard control
6
measure.” It has been well known for decades within the annals of
social science research, however, that eyewitness reports are
notoriously inaccurate. Nonetheless, the criminal justice system
continues to put great weight on eyewitness testimony; in
consequence, the most common cause of wrongful convictions is
7
eyewitness error.
Some may object that, flawed though it is, we have no choice but
to consider the testimony of eyewitnesses, and should weigh it
appropriately. The use of lineups as a means for assessing the
accuracy of eyewitness recall, however, reveals at least one way in
which the current methodology could be vastly improved.
The most common way of presenting a lineup is to show an
eyewitness a group of several people all at once, including one or
more actual suspects. This method of presentation, however, has
been shown to introduce subtle pressure to choose one of the
individuals presented, and consequently leads to a higher rate of false
identification. As the research of Gary Wells and Rod Lindsay has
shown, however, presenting culprits one at a time, and asking
eyewitnesses to decide in each case whether this is or is not the
perpetrator, leads to 50% fewer false identifications, while not

5. Charles Leslie, Scientific Racism: Reflections on Peer Review, Science, and
Ideology, 31 SOC. SCI. & MED. 891, 896 (1990).
6. Atul Gawande, Under Suspicion: The Fugitive Science of Criminal Justice, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 8, 2001, at 50.
7. Id.
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effecting correct ones. One might think, based on such dramatic
results, that the use of sequential lineups would become widespread.
Yet, despite a 1999 report by the Department of Justice that extolled
the virtues of sequential lineups, only a handful of police
departments—mostly outside the United States—have adopted them.
In social science, subjective factors all too often trump empirical
evidence.
Must it be like this? Does lack of perfect objectivity in practice
necessitate the abandonment of the objective ideal and a
corresponding neglect of the scientific attitude? Must the subjective
nature of our interest in human behavior color the way that we
conduct social inquiry? Of course, we cannot turn off our interests,
hopes, and fears, when we are engaging in science. But what we can
do is attempt to keep them from blinding us to what our inquiry is
trying to tell us.
Here once again it is instructive to consider the example of
medicine. In medicine we have an example of a science in which we
have tremendous vested interests, yet where we realize that there is
no purpose served in allowing wishful thinking or ideology to
influence our analysis of how things are. Our overriding interests in
medicine, like in social science, are normative. We have a practical
goal in mind when conducting our inquiry; we know at the outset
what it is that we value. Yet in medicine we do not use normativity as
an excuse to abandon scientific standards: to cherry pick data to
support a favored hypothesis or otherwise abuse statistics. Aiming at
objectivity—even where it is not completely reachable—is an
important aspect of any scientific inquiry.
In social inquiry,
subjectivity need not serve as a barrier to the scientific attitude any
more than it does in natural science or medicine.
Prognosis

Given the potential for the social sciences to learn from and
model their approach to inquiry on the methodological situation
faced by medicine, may we expect the revolution anytime soon in the
study of human behavior? No. For it is worth pointing out here that
there is something missing in the social sciences—that was developed
in the science of physics in the 17th century and the science of
medicine during the 19th century—that has misfired in the social

8. R. C. L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identification From
Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
556, 561 (1985).
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scientific revolution that was hoped for after the Enlightenment. It is
respect for the critical attitude that teaches us to acknowledge the
vastness of our ignorance and the superiority of empirical methods
when it comes to gathering knowledge about matters of fact. No
matter the complexity of the subject matter, this is the first and most
essential step toward scientific inquiry. To accept the ideal of the
scientific attitude toward gathering knowledge—even when it cannot
always be met in practice—is the mark of a field that is ready to move
forward as a science.
Too often in social inquiry the practitioners think that they
already know the answer to the question of why people go to war or
commit crime, based on intuition or our allegedly special access to the
subject matter of social science, so that we do not need to engage in
9
any empirical investigation.
Unfortunately, many also eschew
careful empirical inquiry in the social sciences because they fear the
consequences that it may have for their most closely held political
beliefs about human nature.
But this is to surrender to the worst side of subjectivity. And, it
is worth remembering that the history of scientific progress has been
one of relentless assault on such prejudices. The early practitioners of
medicine were little assisted in their understanding of the human
heart despite the fact that they each had one; their understanding of
disease was scarcely advanced by the fact that they could also fall ill.
Mocked by failure, medicine eventually turned to science as a model
for gaining knowledge about a subject that quite simply could not be
understood in any other way. The same is true in the study of human
behavior. As in medicine, it is no favor to a sick society—one
plagued by racism, war, crime, and child abuse—to pretend that we
know what causes such problems when we do not. As in medicine,
the social sciences will be doomed to play an ineffectual role in
improving human life until they have gathered enough knowledge in
a systematic way to be of more use in public affairs.
To some the prospects for such a revolution may appear dim.
But, with the proper methodology, relatively rapid progress is
possible. In the 17th century in physics and in the 19th century in
medicine, who could have imagined the enormous success that would
be enjoyed when empirical and experimental methods were finally
employed? The case for a science of human behavior should be no
less compelling. And, as in medicine, the world awaits the outcome.
9. It is interesting to note that this Aristotelian philosophy of relying on reason over
empirical inquiry was once popular in gaining knowledge about nature, before the
Galilean revolution in physics.
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Just as numerous patients died of infectious diseases before there was
a cure for them, today’s society suffers from numerous plagues of our
own making that we are powerless to stop until we understand their
true causes.
In the study of human behavior, no less than in the study of
health and disease, it is no favor to let our values interfere with
gathering the empirical knowledge that is necessary to ameliorate our
suffering and to cure our current ills.
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